

State Culture, Building, and Renewing the Botswana Developmental State

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Abstract

The post-colonial Botswana state elite built a developmental state. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) inherited a developmental state-promoting state culture, which it used to modernise state institutions, to focus on creating new wealth for the nation, to build a small but coherent state structure and to centralise the exploitation of natural resources. However, the BDP developmental state reached a point of collapse and two revolutions from above were instituted to try to revive it. This is what this paper argues.

Introduction

This paper reconsiders Botswana's developmental state and argues that the country's good developmental record is explained by the manner in which the state was modernised through a revolution from above, the blending of the top structures of the ruling party and the cabinet, the pursuing of developmental nationalism, and centralised planning. The article also argues that factionalism had the potential to destroy Botswana's developmental state until a political renewal was instituted.

For over forty years, Botswana has experienced sustained and spectacular economic growth rates. Between 1966 and 1995, Botswana's per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew from about P1, 682 to P7, 863 (US\$2,850) in 1993/94 constant prices. The high economic growth has been sustained well beyond 2007. 'Overall, the economy continued to record a strong positive growth. In real terms, the GDP grew significantly, by 8.3% in 2004/2005, compared to a growth rate of 6.2% recorded during the 2006/2007 financial year. This revises the average growth rate for the first three years of NDP 9 to 5.3%, which is higher than the estimated of 4.7% in the Mid-Term Review of NDP 9' (Gaolathe, 2006). Foreign exchange reserves substantially increased from P24.26 billion in December 2004 to P34.7 billion in November 2005. In US dollar terms, the foreign exchange reserves increased from \$5.7 billion to \$6.2 billion over the same period (Gaolathe, 2006:7). Foreign exchange reserves continued to increase to P48.8 billion in 2006 and P59.8 billion in 2007 (Gaolathe, 2008:5). 'In US dollar terms the reserves increased by US \$2.3 billion to US \$10.2 billion over the same period' (Gaolathe, 2008:5). Real GDP in 1993/94 prices grew by 5.7 per cent (P19.3 billion) in 2003/04,

compared to 7.8 per cent in 2002/03 (Gaolathe, 2005). In addition, 'Botswana's credit ratings by Moody's Investor Services and Standard and Poor's remained unchanged at "A" grading for the seventh year running' (Gaolathe, 2008:5). Thus, Botswana has the financial resources to finance its democratisation for a reasonable period of time. It has the right governance structures to sustain the socioeconomic development.

This is not to say that there have been no problems, or that the development record of Botswana is without its negative side. Deepening social inequalities have gone hand in hand with these processes of economic growth and ecological degradation has reached worrying proportions as a consequence of extensive and intensive cattle ranching (Yeager, 1993). However, poverty levels have declined over the years due to an expanded social welfare system. By comparison with most societies in the developing world, and especially with Sub-Saharan Africa, Botswana's developmental record has been remarkable, especially for a society which had such unpromising conditions at independence.

Analysts (Charlton, 1991; Leftwich, 1995; Maundeni, 2001 and Taylor, 2003) argue that Botswana has a developmental state that was primarily responsible for the country's development over the years. The concept of the developmental state is borrowed from Chalmers Johnson (1982) who indicates that it is important to consider state priorities in any developmental state research. He starts his definition by categorising the state as developmental states, regulatory states, equality states, ideological states, military states and many others. Johnson says these states are explained by their priorities. He defines the developmental state as that which prioritises economic development or pursues developmental nationalism. 'A state attempting to match the economic achievements of Japan must adopt the same priorities as Japan, it must pursue developmental nationalism. It must first of all be a developmental state-and only then a regulatory state, a welfare state, an equality state, or whatever other kind of functional state a society may wish to adopt' (Johnson, 1982:306). Johnson says 'for fifty years the Japanese state has given its first priority to economic development' (1982:305). In a more recent publication, Johnson gives his thesis of developmental nationalism a historical element.

This one overriding objective-economic development-was present among the Japanese people after the war, among the Korean people after Syngman Rhee, among the Chinese exiles and the Taiwanese after Chiang Kai-Shek acknowledged that he was not going home again, among the Singaporeans after the Malayan Emergency and their expulsion from Malaysia, among the residents of Hong Kong after they fled communism, and among the Chinese city dwellers after the Cultural Revolution (1999: 52-53).

Thus, Johnson introduces a notion which he calls developmental nationalism, a determination to pursue developmental goals against all odds and to resist pressures against it.

The approach used in the analysis that follows takes state culture as primary (Maudeni, 2000 and 2001), and argues that a developmental state needs to be led by a party that is embedded in a culture of development or developmental nationalism, and that factionalism could disrupt such a culture as it introduces patronage politics. The current article shows how the Botswana developmental state emerged from Tswana state culture that contained elements of centralisation, discipline, and developmental nationalism in it.

BDP's Inheritance of an Ancient Developmental State Culture

Botswana inherited an ancient state culture that promoted coherent state institutions and focused on wealth creation and disciplined social forces, while it steered away from predatory politics by creating a small but effective administration. This idea has been explored elsewhere (Maudeni, 2000 and 2001) and will not be repeated here. A summary will suffice. Although by 1600, the Sotho and the Tswana already occupied approximately their modern habitat (Alverson, 1978 and Gulbrandsen, 2007) only the latter had already developed a state culture which promoted institutionally centralised state institutions. There had existed eight Tswana states in the pre-colonial period (the Ngwato, Kwena, Ngwaketse, Tawana, Lete, Kgatla, Tlokwa and the Rolong states in no historical order). In *Town-State Formations on the Edge of the Kalahari*, Gulbrandsen observed that the Tswana built city states in the desert, contrary to conventional theory of ecological determinism (2007:55).

Moffat's observations pose a problem for anthropologists. On one hand, the settlement pattern of the Tswana is described as concentrated and densely populated, approaching a size that is exceptional in Central or Southern Africa. Yet on the other hand, the Tswana, with their huge dependence on cattle, are clearly pastoralists, and pastoralism normally proves antithetical to the high population density described by Moffat, as concentrated populations are associated above all with intensive agriculture (Gulbrandsen, 2007:56).

Thus, the Tswana had developed a centralised state culture characterised by concentrated settlement patterns resembling city states.

In addition, the moral and religious life of the Tswana was also centralised. Each of the pre-colonial Tswana Chiefs stood between the *badimo* (ancestors) and the social world. 'Modimo [God] was too remote to be reached directly by pleas of living men. It could be approached only through the spirits of the dead (*badimo*); and the chief's task was to pray to his own ancestors, asking them to intercede' (Schapera, 1971:17-18). What were normally regarded as

religious and magical functions that were performed by religious and by other civil institutions in other societies, were performed directly by the Chiefs or indirectly through civil institutions that were under their control. For instance, while God could be approached in times of economic difficulties caused by natural disasters and in times of economic abundance, only the states could do so and, even then, only indirectly through *badimo*. In times of drought it was neither the priest nor individual rainmakers but the state that took the lead. Such state leadership was supported by the state culture of the society. The *badimo* stood between the Chiefs and *Modimo*. The Tswana Chiefs were the mediators and the actors in religious rites. They possessed magical powers and were the rainmakers (Schapera, 1971 and Setiloane, 1976). In the case of Chief Linchwe of the Bakgatla and Chief Sekgoma I of the Ngwato, they were each not only an intermediary, they were in fact the *moroka wa pula*, 'the rainmaker' (Schapera, 1971:117). Even when there were better rainmakers than the Chiefs (a rare occurrence), they performed activities that attracted rain only as employees of, or advisers to, the Chiefs (Schapera, 1971). Thus, the possession of magical and real political power by the Chiefs led to the subordination of all religious and magical institutions, and to the centralisation of social power in the states.

Furthermore, the Chief's ancestors were regarded as the most senior and therefore the Chief was regarded as the most senior living person (Schapera, 1971 and Maundeni, 2001). Before contacts with the missionaries in the 1820s, priestly institutions did not arise or gain ascendancy parallel to the Tswana state. There was no parallel religious institution that rivalled the state. Thus, there was no fragmentation of social power. Instead, political and religious powers and functions were centralised and institutionalised in the state (Maundeni, 2001).

State functions in each pre-colonial Tswana state were not divided into parallel, competing and rival state institutions. State power was centralised in eight coherent states and in each, the central state elites were centrally controlled from one institution and performed different functions without a plurality of institutions. In the place of administrative institutions, the Tswana states practised an advisory rather than an institutional system of administration. The system of administration involved: (1) confidential advisors selected on the basis of the trust which the Chief had in them, regardless of social status or (*dikala tsa kgosi*); (2) councils of *Bagolwane* (singular, *mogolwane*; usually translated to mean 'headman') (Gosset, 1986:107). The headmen were appointed for life. That is, as long as they remained loyal to the state. 'Most often consulted were those persons selected as confidential advisors. Most of the advisors in this category were relatives of the Chief, but there was no requirement that they be so. Rather, the principal qualifications of these other unrelated advisors was outstanding ability and shrewdness, loyalty to the chief, and general political influence in the tribe' (Robertson, 1978:19).

In addition, it was normal for the states to invite knowledgeable

foreigners (black and white) (expatriates in present-day language) to stay at the capitals as advisors. Foreigners who had particular skills that were desirable and unavailable locally were invited (Schapera, 1970; Tlou, 1972 and Gosset, 1986). In the Tswana state, which was typical, this well established state practice was most notable after contacts with European foreigners. 'The presence of Europeans at the capital had some important economic and political consequences. The traders taught the Tswana much-needed skills such as wagons and gun weaponry and moulding lead bullets for muzzle loaders....The resident Europeans were also important to Moremi (the Tswana chief) as advisors in matters relating to trade and relations with Europeans. In 1884 Strombom [a Swede] was Moremi's advisor, interpreter, and sometimes secretary. The prestige of these men derived from their indispensability at a time when no Tswana could yet speak or write European languages. The early traders were generally loyal to Moremi because their trade and security depended on him' (Tlou, 1972:195). So, the Tswana states were able to enhance their capacity to govern without the need to create huge administrative institutions.

The political assemblies, *dikgotla*, were the most important state institutions (Gulbrandsen, 2007). State policies were supposedly made there. All adult males participated and this has been regarded in some quarters as an ancient democracy, comparable to ancient Greek democracy. They were where the Chiefs' authority was active and was put in check, and where the male identity was defined (Gulbrandsen, 2007). Though democratic only in the sense that all adult males participated, the *dikgotla* were in fact highly centralised institutions, with seniority playing a central role (Gulbrandsen, 2007:66). The *dikgotla* were the ancient initiator state at work. An inner circle of influential citizens constituted the state and dominated the proceedings. Active 'participation in the *kgotla* was limited to a core element of dominant Tswana men' and the assembly was 'manipulated' to get the people's 'consent' (Mgadla and Campbell, 1989).

What is most striking is the way the Tswana states managed to concentrate and institutionalise state power and to exercise it to build highly coherent political systems without the use of standing armies (Maudeni, 2001). Unlike the neighbouring states, eg., the Zulu, the Ndebele, and Rozvi, which had large predatory standing armies, the Tswana states had only ad hoc armies or militias (Norton, 1986). The Tswana thus spent comparably little on defence. This was despite the fact that the Tswana had been invaded by the Ndebele and the Kololo a number of times. The nation's male population constituted the state militias in times of internal and external threats. Tswana age-groups or militias were different from age-regiments of standing armies. They were chosen from the sons of prominent people and performed varied public duties such as road construction, national hunts, and state defence. The Tswana militias obeyed the state and protected property. The pre-colonial Tswana had no army generals on whom depended the fate of the state and

who could turn into warlords or Joel Migdal's strongmen who could threaten the state, as in pre-revolutionary China. Instead, the Tswana Chiefs were both the commanders-in chief and were personally expected to lead the militias in combat.

The emphasis on political discipline was evident in the manner in which the pre-colonial Tswana states were organised according to the ward-system, which placed the Chiefs at the centres. The state capitals were divided into three political and administrative divisions: 'Central', 'Upper', and 'Lower' (Schapera, 1970). These were called wards. 'The wards in each political and administrative division (*ntlha*, 'side' or 'direction') sometimes acted together, but were not, for example, collectively subject to the authority of a single headman...Among the Ngwato, the whole [state], and not merely every town, came to be divided into four 'sections' (*dikgotla*, sing. *kgotla*) and the chief was the political, administrative, judicial, and military head of all of them' (Schapera, 1970:81). This proved to be an effective method of institutionalising state power and of preventing the rise of 'strongmen' (Migdal, 1996) which weakened states. In addition, the state-initiated three-tiered settlement patterns of the Tswana state codes were enforceable and achievable. 'For the Bechuana, unlike most of the southern Bantu, live, not in small villages or scattered family groups, but in large towns built round the chief's *kgotla*, or courtyard, which serves as the meeting place of the tribe and the court house of the chief' (Schapera, 1970 and 1971; Gulbrandsen, 2007). The Tswana lived in huge towns, sometimes with populations of 20 000 people (Hodgson and Ballinger, 1932:7; Schapera, 1970 and Maundeni, 2001). First, there were the residential towns where the adult male population was expected to reside at all times. Second, there were the crop fields, where women and 'serfs' (*malata*) temporarily stayed (October-July) during the rainy seasons to attend to their crops. Third, there was the cattle post where boys and serfs stayed, 'whose contacts with village life were mostly sporadic and brief' (Schapera, 1970: 4). People were not allowed to abandon their residence in the town and to settle permanently either at the cattle posts, or in the fields. In the event of disobedience, the state 'sometimes even burned down the huts built there by the people' (Schapera, 1970:85). As a result of strict settlement policies, in Bakgatla territory for instance, about three-fifths of the people lived round the Chief at Mochudi (the capital) (population, according to the 1936 census, approximately 8600). The rest were distributed over nine other villages from six to thirty miles away (Schapera, 1970:3).

The question of loyalty to the states was sharply demonstrated in cases of rebellious individuals or groups, particularly members of the royal families. While it was normal for rebels against the states to emerge as in other societies, dealing with them varied according to the particular state culture and state traditions. Rebels against the Tswana states were largely dealt with politically and legally in the assembly, *kgotla*. Mechanisms for dealing with dangerous political rebels were limited to deportations and to confiscation of property

(Schapera, 1970:80). This was an option the states relied on extensively to defuse political tensions in general and to defuse it within the royal family in particular. Confiscating a rebel's wealth was an effective measure of preventing the rise of 'strongmen'. Sometimes rebels were either coerced to settle in a part of the country designated for them by the state, or they were forced to leave and their property was confiscated. Because the Tswana took the boundaries of their territories seriously, deported rebels always found themselves in another Tswana state that would also demand their loyalty.

What remains to be shown is the contact of the core BDP elites with that ancient state culture. The question of inheritance in Botswana is partly settled by the fact that the initial core BDP elite had been trained and employed by the various old Tswana states or tribal administrations. The two leading BDP politicians, Seretse Khama and Quett Masire had direct contact with centralised Tswana institutions in their youth and in the beginning of their adult life (Macarthy, 1971; van Resberg, 1975; Tlou, Parsons and Henderson, 1995 and Maundeni, 1998).

Seretse Khama was born and brought up in the most rigidly maintained atmosphere of tribal discipline and tradition. He ... was first educated at home till he was ten, whereafter he attended three chosen schools in South Africa-Tiger Kloof, Adams College and Lovedale. He entered Fort Hare University in 1941 and graduated after three years with a BA in history. Instead of taking up his chieftainship, he went to England to read law, politics and economics at Balliol College, Oxford, as well as at the Inner Temple, London (van Resberg, 1975:15).

Being the grandson of the famous Khama III (1875-1923), Seretse Khama (1921-1980), the first BDP leader and the first president of Botswana, had been elaborately trained to be Chief (Tlou, Parsons and Henderson, 1995). He was disinherited of his chiefship due to a 1948 controversy generated by his marriage to an English woman. But he became a nationalist reformer.

BDP and Botswana's vice president, Quett Masire's education and training had not only been supervised and funded by Chief Bathoen, he also founded the Seepapitso (named after the former Bangwaketse Chief) secondary school and was a master farmer certificate holder. His service as a member of the Bangwaketse state/tribal council (and as the Bangwaketse minister of agriculture [Morton and Ramsay, 1996]) exposed him to the Tswana state culture. No doubt they could have been overwhelmed if their colleagues had not had a similar exposure. To build an initiator developmental indigenous state, they needed like-minded reformers who had been exposed to and disciplined by the old Tswana states. Fortunately, they were available.

Most of the BDP's central committee and its electoral candidates in the pre-independence election of 1965 had been employees of the old

Tswana states that had disciplined them. For example, the Bangwato state had employed and disciplined Moutlakgola Nwako who had served as its treasurer and the Bakwena state had later employed him from 1954 to 1964 as its secretary. His employment as treasurer at Moeng College (Bangwato state college) (Botswana Democratic Party, 1965) exposed him to that state's discipline. The employment of Englishman Kgabo in the Bakwena state as secretary of the schools committee, treasurer, tribal councillor, and member of a Licensing Board (Botswana Democratic Party, 1966) also exposed him to state discipline. Other members had been prominent administrators as headmasters of primary and secondary Tswana state/national schools. For instance, Gaefalale Sebeso's service as the headmaster of Shoshong primary school (Bangwato national school) and Tsoebebe's as the head teacher of Bakgatla national school exposed them to Tswana state culture. All the above people later formed the cabinet of the first BDP government. My argument is that the BDP state elite revolutionised state institutions from the top.

Modernising the Old Tswana States

This section will demonstrate that there was a revolution from above, by elites who shared in the old culture but were bent on modernisation. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) nationalist politicians modernised the state from above - what Ellen Kay Trimberger (1978) calls 'revolution from above'. This process involved the replacement of tribal elite with national ones who shared the same background, replacing ethnic institutions with republican and bureaucratic ones and modernising state goals by enjoining developmental nationalism.

Constitutional reforms started in 1959 in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (colonial Botswana) and involved the Chiefs and new Tswana elite, the British Government, and representatives of the small local white population. The first Joint Advisory Council Constitutional Committee (1959) made some 'conservative' proposals which united the old and new state elites and led to the formation of mass based parties. It proposed the setting up of a 'Legislative Council' rather than either a parliament or a republic (Bechuanaland Government, 1963). Other conservative proposals included the recommendation of communal instead of common roll type of elections, parity of representation between whites and blacks even though the former was numerically insignificant, and indirect elections of the African members (effectively, Chiefs who dominated the African Advisory Council decided who was to be a member of the proposed Legislative Council). The Joint Advisory Council (set up by the protectorate state in 1960) dominated by old and new Tswana state elites, Protectorate officials and representatives of the white community approved the recommendations in October, 1960 (Bechuanaland Government, 1963:9). Its approval of a constitution which expressly rejected a parliament and a republic and which expressly accepted a white Resident Commissioner as the chairman of the new state institutions had serious

implications. It led to the formation of the opposition pan-African Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) in December 1960 and of the BDP in 1962. This was significant because it separated the conservative new Tswana moderniser state elites from the populist nationalists. It clearly identified the BDP as the party of Chiefs and therefore the inheritor of their legitimacy and institutions. It identified the BPP populists as the destroyers of chieftaincy and therefore the enemies of the state. But it also had the significant implication that it deferred the distribution of state power to a later date.

The pan-African BPP was formed to oppose the chairmanship of the Protectorate Resident Commissioner and the limited legislative council, and to campaign for a full Parliament with a Speaker and for a Republic (Morton and Ramsay, 1998 and Maundeni, 1998). It was formed by politicians who had previously been excluded from Tswana state politics and who had been engaged in South African mass protest politics and were expelled and banned from that country (Edge, 1996). It sought direct participation in the constitutional process and in the process leading to the construction of the post-colonial state. But its protest nationalism was unsuited to a colonial and postcolonial Botswana where super colonial exploitation had been effectively prevented by the Chiefs and where the only working class was the migrant labour in South African mines, farms, and industry. So, the Chiefs and BDP nationalist politicians used conservative constitutional proposals to expose, isolate, and destroy the populist mass-based parties.

Like other constitutionalist political parties which sought to revolutionise and modernise rather than to dethrone a previous regime, the BDP participated constitutionally in the process of reforms and modernisation of the postcolonial state and of the Tswana states. In early 1966, the final constitutional conference was called in London, as it was common practice to finalise the constitution. What was more significant was that the last constitutional conference took place after the BDP had already formed the post colonial government after a landslide electoral victory in 1965, in which they won 28 of the 31 seats, handing the BPP a crushing defeat. Unlike in other constitutional processes in which populist nationalists had been dominant, as in Ghana, Zambia, and Tanzania, the holding of the final constitutional talks after the BDP had won state power in the Botswana case reduced the bargaining power of the populist pan-African BPP. So, when Botswana political elites met in London to finalise the independence constitution in 1966, the political landscape had changed in favour of the BDP-state and in favour of the concentration of power in an executive presidency. Thus, the BDP won both races: designing of the national constitution and occupancy of state power.

The BDP had also staged a kind of palace coup against the Chiefs who were negotiating their continued participation in state politics through unfamiliar institutions that the BDP Government introduced, such as land boards, district councils, parliament, and cabinet. The BDP state used the blending process in order to reform and modernise the old indigenous state.

In order for the supplanting of chiefly institutions and for the usurpation of their functions not to alienate the old Tswana state elites, it decreed that they become ex-officio members by virtue of their office as Chiefs. While Chiefs were excluded from parliament and cabinet, they were appointed to the chairmanship of the new local institutions that were wholly composed of modernising politicians and officials. In short, the so-called democratic government of the BDP excluded the Chiefs from the core central government institutions, but suspended the use of elections in order to allow them into local government structures. Thus, the old state elite were side-lined and relegated to local institutions which they chaired. This blending of the new and the old state elites smoothed the institutional reform process.

But the usurpation of chiefly institutions and powers did not go unchallenged. In the pre-independence 1965 election, the opposition BPP had obtained three parliamentary seats, one in the Bakgatla area of Chief Linchwe II who had become an opponent of the government. Furthermore, Chief Bathoen II of the Ngwaketse resigned from chieftaincy in 1969 and stood on the ticket of the newly formed opposition Botswana National Front (BNF). The former Chief easily won against Vice President Quett Masire in that and the subsequent year's elections. But President Khama used his powers of appointment to retain Masire and made him his Vice President. Thus, their challenges against the BDP state were not proving effective. Executive powers and liberal democracy were not used radically to expand participatory democracy, but conservatively to contain opposition from old state elites and to retain the coherence of the state. The next sub-section analyses the blending of the BDP and the government in order to construct a disciplined, focused, and developmentally effective small state.

Developmental Nationalism and Placing State Power in Developmental Institutions

A single-minded determination to pursue developmental goals for an extended period of time is known as developmental nationalism. This notion is not intended to start a debate on nationalism but to emphasise the point that developmental states prioritise development over conventional ideologies. Developmental states elevate the pursuit of developmental goals into an ideology to gain legitimacy from the population. The point I want to argue is that the BDP political elite placed economic development at the level of an ideology, to be found even in its manifestos.

BDP's Seretse Khama noted that 'Botswana is a poor country and in economic terms one of the poorest in Africa. We must remedy this state of affairs' (Botswana Democratic Party, 1969). The BDP was concerned about the general poverty of the nation as compared with other African countries, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, that inherited relatively rich economies at independence and committed themselves to redistribution. The BDP committed itself to economic prosperity in order to catch up with the

rest of Africa. Its commitment to explicitly capitalist developmental goals was not surprising because the leading BDP state politicians were themselves cattle accumulators (Tsie, 1996) and had intimate relations with the emerging business community and the bureaucracy. The absence of effective colonisation had made the country extremely poor, thus contributing to the emergence of the ideology of developmental nationalism.

In addition, the BDP's explicit capitalist developmental commitment was supported by the scholarship of the day. Mostly liberal scholars, they reported about chronic shortages of water in the country, frequently failing rains, tsetse-fly and foot-and-mouth that threatened the cattle industry, and pasture in danger of deteriorating. They stressed poor communication and marketing services. They further stressed poor health and education. Inequalities in Botswana only began to be emphasized from the late 1970s onwards with the work of Jack Parson, Louis Picard and others. Thus, in circumstances in which scholarship was predominantly capitalist developmental in outlook and less radical, it was easy to mobilise the whole nation on the endeavour to attain capitalist economic development.

But the BDP's commitment to developmental priorities alone cannot adequately explain the Botswana state's successes at promoting economic development. Developmental commitment needed to be matched with institutional capacity. Creating a truly developmental state required that the whole state machinery be subjected to the leadership of an economic agency of the state. But first, the developmental capacity of such an agency had to be created and empowered to exercise political leadership. Postcolonial Botswana inherited a historically independent and powerful Ministry of Finance, which was developmentally incompetent (Masire, 1998).

The task that faced the post colonial state was either to reform and transform the economically disoriented but constitutionally powerful Ministry of Finance, which would involve purging, or the creation of a new institution that would compete with the former, which would mean fragmenting the government. Development in this case emerges as primarily a political issue, rather than a purely administrative one (Leftwich, 1995). It is attained by getting the political focus and state structures right. The Botswana state established two competing ministries (of Finance and of Development Planning) and quickly learned that the system was inoperable. President Seretse Khama had anticipated competition between the two ministries, and had appointed his Vice President to head the Ministry of Development Planning. By placing this ministry under the Vice president, President Khama was sending clear political signals that his government took economic development seriously.

But the idea of two separate ministries, of Finance and of Development Planning, could not work for a state determined to catch-up economically with the rest of the world. Competition and rivalry between two powerful ministries factionalised the state, led other ministries to defy the leadership of the development planning ministry, and hindered the single-minded pursuit

of development goals. Subsequently, the two ministries were merged and the Vice President became the Minister of the combined Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). However, integration of two formerly hostile and competing ministries was not a guarantee that coherence, discipline, and technical competence would emerge. Not only were coherence and discipline at stake, the developmental component of the state had to prevail if the state were to become a developmental state. Senior bureaucrats who factionalised the MFDP were retired, sometimes early, as in the case of Mr Beeby (Permanent Secretary of Finance). Peter Landell-Mills (the Government Economist) who had been expelled during the rivalry was brought back into the ministry (Masire, 1998).

The institutional re-arrangement of government ministries and the creation of a powerful ministry of MFDP had the result of bestowing authority on that ministry. This ministry was placed at the heart of state power by making its first three ministers Vice Presidents as well and by allowing them to succeed to the presidency of the republic. Before he became president, Finance and Development Planning Minister, Dr Masire (later Sir Ketumile), had been Khama's Vice-President for fourteen years. Before he became president in 1998, the Finance and Development Planning Minister, Festus Mogae, was Masire's Vice-President for five years (Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Peter Mmusi, had resigned in 1991 and died 3 years later). Thus, the tradition of having the first three Ministers of Finance and Development Planning as Vice-Presidents placed the ministry at the heart of state power and ensured that economic development was given priority in state politics.

Constructing a developmental state also involved reforming Parliament. In 1972, the Botswana Parliament was reformed to allow President Khama to cede his leadership of the House to the Vice-President or to a senior member of the government. While this has been criticised in many quarters, it was the right thing to do in pursuit of building a developmental state. Subsequently, the President ceased to participate in the proceedings of the House and was replaced by the Vice-President who happened to be the minister of Finance and Development Planning as well. The reforms allowed the easy mobilisation of Parliament for development purposes. '[T]he government has consistently produced plans. These plans set out the government's own spending forecasts, and summarise its economic policies. Each plan is voted into law by parliament. Thereafter, it is illegal to implement any public sector project that is not in the current plan, without going back to parliament. This means spending ministries cannot negotiate with aid donors independently to finance projects on the plan, and that projects are not started for whose recurrent costs no provision has been made' (Harvey, 1992:343). The MFDP acquired the power to prepare, draft and present all bills that had a fiscal dimension and mobilised parliament to help control the spending of other government ministries, departments and public corporations.

In addition, the various Tswana Chiefs and their communities surrendered their mineral rights to the BDP state through the MFDP. 'Recognising that mineral resources should not be utilised for the exclusive benefit of any one group, and that they lacked the expertise and capital to develop these resources, all tribes voluntarily transferred the mineral rights in their areas to the state' (Masire, 1972). The MFDP acquired planning powers over the exploitation and taxing of mineral resources wherever they were and secured the active cooperation of the then Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs.

In fact, mineral exploration and exploitation became a central government priority in which the MFDP and private international capital such as De Beers invested heavily. The ministry had the primary responsibility for the technical and operational matters in the sector (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1991:177). The MFDP gained power over resources that could otherwise be controlled by other ministries, departments, and the private sector. For instance, in 1972, Vice President Masire initiated the Mineral Rights Tax Bill which empowered his MFDP to allow explorations of minerals in private and state lands. This bill transferred the control over the planning of investing in the mineral resources from the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs, but that ministry cooperated because its departments of Geological Survey and Mines and the international private sector did the prospecting and the supervision.

However, the defeat of mass-based parties in all the previous elections and their exclusion from state politics was accompanied by the defeat of social democratic politics that could have helped in the attempt to reverse the widening social inequalities. Kenneth Good (1992:69) opened one of his articles by arguing that 'Botswana has achieved rapid growth with stability since independence in 1966... but growth and the policies of a selectively interventionist state, have produced increasingly deep inequalities of property and incomes, posing problems for the stability of the political economy in future'. While this may be so, the real danger is the possible fragmentation of the country's developmental state, and its loss of developmental focus. The next sub-section shows how factionalism fragmented the developmental state and how it was later renewed.

The Decline and Renewal of the Developmental State

The argument here is that the developmental state is not a natural phenomenon that is there forever, but is an artifact that could be destroyed either by internal divisions within the ruling party and the state, or by its defeat in electoral politics. I focus on factionalism as it is a more real threat to the developmental party than the prospect of defeat by opposition parties, which is more remote in the case of Botswana. The danger factionalism poses for the developmental state is either not easy to perceive or is difficult to comprehend. Factionalism has been analysed from the point of view of elite theory (Makgala, 2006) and I am analysing it from the point of view of developmental state theory. To begin

with, cohesion, discipline, and single-minded pursuit of developmental goals (core values of a developmental state) had been the norm in the BDP state until 1991 when a Presidential Commission of Enquiry accused the Vice-President and the Chairman of the BDP, Peter Mmusi, and the Minister of Agriculture and Secretary General of the BDP, Daniel Kwelagobe, of corruption. These two powerful figures resigned from the government but remained in their party positions, bringing disunity, factionalism, and rivalry in the state. Their position as Chairman and Secretary General of the party, and their popularity with the ordinary party members placed them in a good position to compete with, and to challenge the authority of, the cabinet they had resigned from. For the first time, the party-cabinet unity was burst asunder and this set them on a collision course. Ministerial appointments were no longer done on merit in terms of attaining developmental goals but either for purposes of balancing factions or for marginalizing a faction, both of which amounted to patronage. Appointments should be based on merit for purposes of building a development state and the BDP state was losing this important principle.

The BDP's initial attempt at revival was not very successful. A 'revolution from above' was initiated in 1998 when President Sir Ketumile Masire retired, together with some of his old ministers. Retiring President Masire appointed and was succeeded by Festus Mogae, who in turn appointed the commander of the army, Lt. General Ian Khama to serve as Vice-President. Masire's retirement was accompanied by both the retirement of veteran party and cabinet members and the defeat of others in party primary elections. Those who voluntarily retired, included Dr Gaosetwe Chiepe, Obed Chilume and Patrick Balopi. Those defeated in the 1998 BDP primary elections included Lemme Makgekgenene. When the party was returned to power in the October 1999 general election it further excluded from cabinet veteran politicians such as Chapson Butale, Bahite Timane, Ray Molomo and Machael Tshipinare. The Speaker of Parliament, Moutlakgola Ngwako was voted out and Ray Molomo was elected. Thus approximately three-quarters of the old guard ministers and politicians were removed from active service.

The retirement of Lt. General Khama from the army and his appointment as Vice President was intended to instill political discipline in the ruling party and in the government. (His military training, his rise within the ranks in the military and his intimacy with the previous BDP governments – being the son of the first president, legitimised his new role of disciplining the fragmented state elites, of bringing cohesion and unity in the state and of ending high state spending). For the first time, Botswana was moving away from the practice in which ministers of Finance and Development planning ended up being vice president and subsequently, president. This change was a way of dealing with factionalism. In September 2000, Lt. General Khama whose unauthorised interference in other ministries was causing concern within government, assumed the role of the de facto Prime Minister when he was appointed to coordinate and supervise them.

However, factionalism has persisted in the BDP, cementing the necessity to move away from the practice in which ministers of development planning become vice presidents and presidents, and moving into a practice in which former military men become vice presidents and presidents. Whether this is a temporary detour (until factionalism is brought under control) or a permanent new politics, remains to be seen. However, the point is that, developmental politics characterised by the ministry of development planning taking the centre state of state power, have been replaced and whether the new trend of the ascendancy of former military will continue to be developmental, remains to be seen.

President Festus Mogae retired in April 2008 and was replaced by Lt. Gen. Ian Khama who appointed Lt. Gen. Mompoti Merafhe to be vice president. In his inaugural speech, President Ian Khama promised to renew the structures and policies of the party and government. He explicitly emphasised four Ds - democracy, development, discipline, and dignity in that order as his driving values. At an address to BDP youth later, he re-prioritised his Ds and started with discipline. He pointed out that discipline was about being considerate to others, loyalty to the party and trust:

Within our party we have had to redirect our efforts to fighting off factions that threatened to break us apart. We have spoken about party unity and agreed, that it is only when we are united, that our achievements at the polls, have been impressive. The main culprit and threat to our unity has been selfishness and indiscipline. I get very concerned when some party members fail to be loyal to the party and its rules only to put their own interests above those of the party. It is being disciplined to this way of thinking that our contributions to the party and the nation will have more meaning (Khama, 2008:3).

It is hoped that this focus on discipline is intended to restore the developmental politics of the BDP rather than to move away from them. But President Ian Khama was explicitly concerned about winning elections. There is a good chance that the BDP developmental state could experience a renewal, but there is also a good chance that it could be moving away from developmental state politics, more so that the Minister of development planning was not appointed the vice president and neither was he appointed the leader of the House. These, and the manner in which the new president carries out his ministerial appointments, crucially determine whether Botswana is reviving or moving away from developmental state politics.

Conclusion

The BDP political elite inherited and used the Tswana state culture to build a state with a determined focus on economic development, a disciplined and

coherent state that supported developmental politics, a reformed parliament that was easily mobilised to support developmental politics and a disciplined traditional leadership that ceded natural resources to the state. The concentration of state power in the powerful Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, and the promotion of such ministers into the vice presidency and presidency of the country, were the culmination points in the building of the Botswana developmental state.

However, the developmental state risked collapsing from factional fights that fragmented the ruling party. Change of leadership in 1998 fuelled factionalism and fragmentation. Another change of leadership in 2008 could signal the re-entry of developmental state values or their demise in the hands of retired generals. In theoretical terms, a developmental state can be constructed by a ruling party that is coherent, developmentally focused and that places developmental institutions at the heart of state power. Such politics needs to be renewed periodically for the state to remain developmentally focused.

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